本研究旨在探討產業競爭度在公司治理機制與經營績效的關聯性中，所扮演的角色。亦即探討企業面臨不同的產業競爭程度時，其治理機制對企業績效之影響為何。研究對象為2000年至2009年台灣上市櫃公司。研究方法係利用普通最小平方法(OLS)進行迴歸分析。實證結果發現：(1) 股權結構中，在考慮產業競爭度下，CEO持股比、機構投資人持股比與公司績效皆呈顯著負相關。顯示隨著產業競爭程度的增加，CEO持股比、機構投資人持股比愈高，愈有助於提高公司之經營績效；(2) 董事會組成中，在考慮產業競爭度下，內部董事席次比、董事長兼CEO（CEO雙重性）與公司績效亦皆呈顯著負相關。顯示產業競爭度較高之公司，董事會中內部董事席次比愈高、董事長兼CEO，愈有助於提高公司之經營績效。 This study examines the moderating role of industry competition on the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Using a sample of all listed firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taiwan’s over-the-counter market (GTSM) over a ten-year period (2000~2009). Empirical results show that CEO shareholding, industry competition, and firm performance are significantly negatively correlated. It means that with the increase in the degree of industry competition, the higher CEO shareholding will increase firm performance. Similarly, with the increase in industry competition, the higher institutional investor shareholding, the ratio of inside directors, and CEO duality will also increase firm performance.
