目前有關租賃融資的研究,大多建立在零交易成本與完全訊息的假設之上, 所得到的主要結論為:(1)租賃與債券是完全代替的融資工具。(2)稅率差異是租 賃的決定因素。然而,相關實証研究並未支持這兩個傳統上之結論。 本研究為異於傳統的分析方法,即利用代理人理論為構架,假定有租賃契約 有交易成本與代理成本存在,然後比較租賃與債券之契約成本,從而認為租賃有 較低的代理成本與較高的交易成本。因此,有高的債券代理成本之廠商,當槓桿 水準超過某一限度之後,以租賃融資代替債券融資可能比較有利。 Most of the existing literature on leasing is based onthe neo-classical assumptions of zero transition costs and perfect information. Theyargued that leasing and debt are substitutes in financing an asset and that different tax rates motivate leasing. However, empirical studies have not supported either the theoretical contention that lease and debt ae substitutes or popular contention that have is motivated by taxes. This study differs from the traditional approach to financial leasing found in extent literature by explicitly taking the existence of transtion cost and agency cost into considerations. It is shown that leasing has lower agency cost and higher transation cost than debt. Therefore, firms with high of debt beyound a certain level of leverage may find it advantageous to adopt lease finance that debt finance