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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://140.128.103.80:8080/handle/310901/20182


    Title: 公司風險承受度與經理人固守職位關係之研究
    Other Titles: The Relation Between Corporate Risk Taking And Managerial Entrenchment
    Authors: 王吉崇
    Wang,Ji-Chong
    Contributors: 詹家昌
    Chan,Chia-Chung
    東海大學財務金融學系
    Keywords: 風險承受度;固守職位;銀行往來關係
    Risk taking;Managerial Entrenchment;Bank Relationships
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-01-02T03:37:28Z (UTC)
    Abstract: 本文研究目的是透過經理人異動的觀點,觀察經理人是否會採用銀行往來關係的策略,以固守本身的職位。由於過去文獻強調風險是經理人固守職位考慮下相當重要的因素,因此本文將透過公司風險承受度來檢視經理人固守職位與銀行往來關係是否有關。實證結果發現經理人是否能夠固守職位與公司的風險程度有顯著的關係,經理人為了本身利益將採取降低公司的風險承受度。在固守職位與公司風險承受度關連的研究方面,本文發現年資愈長,經理人承受風險的程度愈小;而當經理人兼任董事長或持股比率愈高,其愈能承受較高的公司風險,且隨著公司風險增加,經理人異動率也會隨之提高。因多重銀行往來關係的企業與銀行間存在較高的資訊不對稱問題,公司面臨財務困境的危機較低,經理人較易鞏固本身職位。本文除了發現在多重銀行下,公司有較高的風險承受度外,亦發現經理人異動後的公司風險承受度下降幅度,比無多重銀行關係的企業小,此結果顯示經理人有採取多重銀行往來關係策略以鞏固自身職位安全的可能性。
    The purpose of our research is to review whether managers will adopt a strategy which called bank relationships to do entrenchment via the aspect of changing the manager. Owing to the past literatures emphasize that corporate risk is an important factor when managers consider entrenchment. Therefore, our research will investigate the relationship between managerial entrenchment and bank relationships through the perspective of corporate risk taking. Empirical evidences proved that there is a significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and risk taking of firms. Managers have incentives to lower risk taking of firms for their own benefit. In the empirical investigation about the relation between managerial entrenchment and risk taking, we have found out that the more serving years at one firm, the less risk taking of managers. When the managers are also as the board of directors or they have higher holding stock ratio in company, then they can take higher risks. Due to the increasing risks for firms, the turnover rate of mangers will increase. In addition, because the firms which have multiple bank relations will exist higher asymmetric information, firms will face lower financial risks, and managers will become more easier to do entrenchment. Our research not only discovered that firms will have higher risk taking under multiple bank relations, but also discovered the decline range of risk taking after change managers will smaller than the firms which didn’t have multiple bank relations. The result shows the possibilities that managers will use the strategy of multiple bank relations to do managerial entrenchment.
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系所] 碩士論文

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