| Abstract: | 近年來，全球化的產業面臨關鍵性的轉變，其中尤以科技產業為最劇烈。本研究將以台灣晶圓代工產業為例，探討當台灣非垂直整合領導廠商(台積電)面對韓國垂直整合廠商(三星)競爭時，台灣領導廠商(台積電)可以採取向上游(封裝)做垂直整合，而韓國也可以採取將更上游(機器設備)做垂直整合，對於其經濟效益會產生何影響?本研究分為三種模型架構來探討：模型一為非對稱垂直整合；模型二為對稱垂直整合；模型三為上游獨占、下游寡占。本研究引用Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) 之經濟模型，但其模型是假設Cournot競爭模型，本文將其修改為Leader-Follower(領導跟隨)模型，並加入政府研發補助之政策效果。在此假設非垂直整合廠商為市場上的領導者，垂直整合廠商為跟隨者，探討當領導廠商在採用垂直整合上游(封裝)策略，以及跟隨廠商垂直整合更上游(機器設備)後，其研究結果如下：一、 領導廠商在垂直整合後(由模型一到模型二)，對跟隨廠商的威嚇效果會更大。二、 當跟隨廠商往更上游(機器設備)做垂直整合後(模型三)，還是存在威嚇效果。三、 跟隨廠商得到政府研發補助後，對領導廠商之威嚇效果並無影響。四、 當跟隨廠商的政府研發補助越多，對領導廠商的利潤會減少，跟隨廠商的利潤會增加。(模型一、模型二皆成立)五、 當跟隨廠商的政府研發補助越多(模型三)，其利潤則不一定會增加。六、 領導廠商垂直整合上游(封裝)後(從模型一到模型二)，其利潤不一定會增加；但是當市場規模擴大時，其利潤必會增加。七、 跟隨廠商往更上游(機器設備)做垂直整合後(模型三)，當市場規模越大，對領導廠商越不利。關鍵字：垂直整合、領導跟隨模型、市場規模、政府研發補助、威嚇效果
Today, the global industry is facing an important change, especially in the technology industry as the most severe. This paper takes Taiwan wafer foundry industry as an illustration to discuss the financial and economic impacts of 2 firms that have different degrees of vertical integration. To give an example, we would like to analyze economic impacts when Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which is vertically integrated with upstream packaging companies, faces the competition from Samsung, which is vertically integrated with further upstream machinery equipment providers in Korea. To study the above question, this paper constructs three models：model 1 assumes the market is asymmetric vertical integrated; model 2 assumes the market is symmetric vertical integrated; and model 3 the market is monopoly in the upstream and oligopoly in the downstream.This paper is based on the economic model from Buehler & Schmutzler (2008), which assumes Cournot competition model. However, in this paper we assume the Leader-Follower model. In addition, we study the effects of policies of the government R&D subsidy. We assume that the non-vertically integrated firm is the leader in the market, and the vertical-integrated firm is the follower. We also assume that the leading firm adopts a strategy of vertical integration with the upstream (packaging companies), and the following firm adopts a strategy of vertical integration to the further upstream (machinery equipment providers). The results are as follows：1. After vertical integration of the leading firm (from model 1 to model 2), the intimidation effect appears to be stronger.2. When following firm adopts a strategy of vertical integration to the further upstream (machinery equipment providers) (model 3), there still exists intimidation effect.3. After the following firm gets government R&D subsidy, there is no impact on intimidation effect of the leading firm.4. As the amount of government R&D subsidy the following firm increases, the leading firm’s profit decreases, and the following firm’s profit increases for model 1 and model 2.5. As the amount of the government R&D subsidy the following firm increases, its profit does not necessarily increase for model 3. 6. After the leading firm adopts a strategy of vertical integration to the upstream (packaging companies), that is, from model 1 to model 2, its profit does not necessarily increase, but when the market size is expanded, its profit definitely increases.7. We observe that the greater the market size is, the fewer advantages to the leading firm when the following firm adopts a strategy of vertical integration to the further upstream (machinery equipment providers) in model 3.key words: vertical integration、leader-follower model、market size、government R&D subsidy、intimidation effect |
