本文分別依經理人過度自信程度以及公司面對之融資限制將樣本分為兩組，並將公司投資區分為有形投資及無形投資，探討經理人過度自信以及公司面對之融資限制對不同性質投資計畫決策之影響；最後同時考慮此兩類指標，研究過度自信與融資限制間之交互關係對不同性質投資計畫決策之影響。結果發現經理人過度自信在無形投資決策過程中較為明顯，而在有形投資決策過程中則較不受到過度自信影響；而低過度自信經理人較易受到融資限制之影響。另外融資限制對於經理人進行有形投資決策之影響較為明顯，而無形投資決策則較不受融資限制影響；而控制融資限制下，面對低融資限制經理人之過度自信對投資決策影響較明顯。結果顯示經理人過度自信現象在無形投資的決策過程中較為明顯；而無論何種投資型態，在高融資限制下，經理人在進行投資決策時會因資金較不易取得而影響投資。 The samples are classified by the level of managers’ overconfidence and the financial constraints they faced. This thesis aims to examine the effects of managers’ overconfidence and financial constraints on corporate investment policy. We find that the effect of overconfidence is more significant in the intangible investment policy and less significant in the tangible investment policy, and the low overconfident managers are easily influenced by financial constraints. The effect of financial constraints is more significant in the tangible investment policy and less significant in the intangible investment policy. These results show that the effects of managers’ overconfidence are more significant in the intangible investment policy, and the managers will be affected by the lacks of funds in the investment policy under high financial constraints.
