本研究旨在探討會計師懲戒與審計品質的關聯性，檢視國內的懲戒制度對於審計品質的影響。本研究從兩個角度探討審計品質，一是投資人觀點，分析當主管機關做出懲戒宣告後，資本市場的投資人對公司審計品質的認知。另一是觀察會計師在經過懲戒宣告後，查核行為是否有所改善，進而提升審計品質。 本研究的觀察期間為2000年?2005年，以被主管機關做出懲戒宣告的會計師所簽證的上市櫃公司為樣本公司，並以財務報表簽證不實的懲戒原因為主要觀察對象。在投資人觀點方面，以「盈餘反應係數」為衡量審計品質的代理變數；在會計師方面則是以「裁決性應計數」來衡量審計品質。 實證結果發現，在主管機關宣告懲戒訊息後，資本市場投資人的反應比懲戒前要來的好，亦即從投資人的觀點視之，懲戒後審計品質有所提升。相反地，未發現會計師在懲戒之後的公司操弄盈餘的空間明顯變少，從盈餘管理的角度來看，審計品質並沒有太大的改善。且無論是輕懲或是重懲，實證結果均無法支持會計師在懲戒之後會有所警惕，以提升查核品質。 This study investigates the relations between CPA sanction and audit quality to view how the domestic disciplinary sanction system affects audit quality. Our study discusses audit quality from two opinions. One is from the investors, we analysis that the perceptions of the investors in the capital markets are good or bad when the competent authority do the sanction announcement. Another is from the auditors, we observe that after declaring the sanction announcement, the auditing behavior of auditors is better or not and promote the audit quality further. Our test period is from 2000 through 2005 and test samples are the listed (TSE) and OTC companies which attest by auditors who declared the sanction announcement by the competent authority. In investors’ opinion, we use ERC proxy to measure the audit quality. In auditors’ opinion, we use discretionary accruals (DA) proxy to measure the audit quality.The empirical results indicate that, after the competent authority doing the sanction announcement, the responses of the investors in the capital markets are better than before. It means that the audit quality of investors’ point is improved. Conversely, the auditor’s audit quality is not better than before. And no matter the degree of the punishment is serious or slight, the results can’t support that the auditors would improve their audit quality after the sanction.
