瑜亮之爭─稅務訴訟代理人訴訟績效差異之研究

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Title:	瑜亮之爭─稅務訴訟代理人訴訟績效差異之研究
Other Titles:	A Study on Litigation Performance Difference of Tax Litigation Agent
Authors:	陳岳鴻 Chen, Yueh-Hung
Contributors:	林秀鳳 Lin, Hsiu-Feng 東海大學會計學系
Keywords:	內生轉換模型;律師;會計師;訴訟效果;訴訟效率;稅務訴訟 Endogenous switching model;Attorneys;Certified Public Accountant;Litigation effect;Litigation efficiency;Tax litigation
Date:	2010
Issue Date:	2010-12-28T08:19:15Z (UTC)
Abstract:	瑜亮之爭─稅務訴訟代理人訴訟績效差異之研究<br>中文摘要<br>指導教授：林秀鳳博士<br>研究生姓名：陳岳鴻<br>研究生學號：G97430023<br><br>本研究主要探究同是具有我國稅務訴訟代理人資格之律師與會計師在所得稅、營業稅與遺贈稅等主要稅務行政事件的訴訟績效差異。有別於過去針對納稅義務人爭取最大訴訟利益或是降低消耗稀少性法律資源之觀點的單一指標分析，本研究爰用負指數函數概念，結合訴訟效率與訴訟效果的訴訟績效指標，將可綜合評估律師和會計師的訴訟績效差異。<br><br>本研究以最高行政法院與高等行政法院之所得稅、營業稅以及遺贈稅案件判決書為研究樣本，研究期間自2006至2008年。在研究模型方面，本研究也避免主觀選擇估計方法導致推論之偏誤，根據檢定結果，本研究以內生轉換模型(endogenous switching model)為合理的估計模式。<br><br>實證證據顯示，樣本資料有自我選擇效果，透過內生轉換模型分離自我選擇的估計結果，委任會計師所得稅、營業稅與遺贈稅案件的訴訟績效皆優於律師，而在會計師與律師各自所擅長的稅目而言，會計師專精於營業稅，反觀律師營業稅案件之訴訟績效最差。進一步分析指出，訴訟案件金額的高低將能明顯區別稅務訴訟代理人的訴訟績效差異，並釐清最高行政法院與高等行政法院實證結果之分歧。當高訴訟案件金額時，高等行政法院之結論一致，然而可能因高等行政法院強調事實審，但最高行政法院較著重法律審之差異，使得會計師相對於律師較無法施展專業技能。不過，由於所得稅的法令規範繁雜且多屬財務會計準則條文化，因此，就最高行政法院訴訟代理人個人擅長稅目而論，律師的所得稅案件之訴訟績效相較於營業稅與遺贈稅差，反觀會計師對所得稅案件有較佳之表現。至於稅務訴訟代理人選任決策的探索性分析結果，營業稅以及遺贈稅案件傾向委任律師，所得稅案件並未發現委任傾向之差異。<br><br>關鍵字：稅務訴訟，訴訟效率，訴訟效果，會計師，律師，內生轉換模型。 A Study on Litigation Performance Difference of Tax Litigation Agent<br>Abstract<br>Advisor: Dr. Lin, Hsiu Feng<br>Graduate Student Name: Chen, Yueh Hung<br>Graduate Student No.: G97430023<br><br>This paper examines the differences in litigation performance between attorneys and accountants in Taiwan who hold tax litigation qualifications. In contrast to using a single performance indicator to assess litigation efficiency or litigation effect, in this study we adopted the concept of negative exponential function combined with litigation efficiency and litigation effect to develop the litigation performance indicators. These performance indicators will then be integrated to assess the differences in litigation performance of tax litigation agent.<br><br>In this paper, we used a dataset of income, business, estate, and gift tax lawsuits from the supreme administrative court and high administrative court during the period of 2006 t0 2008. Empirical evidence indicated that the dataset was free from the self-selection effect as an endogenous switching model was used. Furthermore, this paper provided peer exploratory study on the process of agent selection decision-making among taxpayers.<br><br>Empirical evidence suggests that the litigation performance of accountants exceeds those of attorneys in all three tax lawsuits. Among the tax lawsuits between accountants and attorneys, accountants has the best litigation performance in the area of business tax lawsuit while attorneys are weakest in that area. Furthermore, relative empirical results show the high-low amount of lawsuit has significant differences between attorneys and accountants that could clarify the discrepancy between the supreme administrative court and high administrative court. The supreme administrative court emphasize trail on law rather than trial on matters of fact, so accountants could not exert effect on professional skill at the supreme administrative court, but the income tax act is more complex and is related to the GAAP, therefore, accountants have better litigation performance of income tax lawsuit than attorneys at the supreme administrative court. Finally, peer exploratory study indicates that taxpayers select attorneys within tax lawsuits of business and estate and gift over accountants. There are no significant differences between the selection of accountants over attorneys for income tax lawsuit.<br><br>Keywords: Tax litigation, Litigation efficiency, Litigation effect, Certified Public Accountant, Attorneys, Endogenous switching model.
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