過去有許多文獻提出了非金融公司與銀行的往來關係，這些文獻的研究結果，大部分認為在解決資訊不對稱或降低因為市場不完美所導致的問題上，扮演了關鍵的角色。在本計畫中，我們的目標除了想瞭解銀行往來關係是否會影響公司風險的承受度外，亦想瞭解融資限制與公司治理因素在這個關系所扮演的角色。事實上，這個關係在公司財務上是相當重要的議題，但要瞭解這個關係相當複雜，原因是金融市場影響公司風險承受度的管道上，有許多因素可以被用來解釋的。本計畫希望探討的另外一個方向，係當確認公司與銀行的往來關係會影響公司的風險承受度後，進而驗證這個關係是否會受到公司是否融資限制的影響。所謂融資限制的意義是公司當市場不完美而使公司缺乏充分的內部資金後，將對公司的投資決策產生負面的影響。我們的假設是公司在較強的銀行往來關係後，將改善公司融資限制問題，進而使公司資金的流動性獲得改善，也使公司有能力增加公司風險的承受度。因此，本計畫希望驗證融資限制公司是否對「銀行往來與風險承受度」的關係上有正向效應。過去文獻許多主張投資者的保護與風險的承受間具有正向的關連，比較好的投資者保護將導致公司採取較具風險且增加價值的投資。例如，投資者受到較佳的保護，將會降低因為私利而採取過度風險避免的決策。在本計畫中，我們希望不只要驗證銀行往來關係與公司風險承受度的關係，也希望瞭解這個關係是否會受到公司治理強弱的影響。我們的想法是風險的選擇不只會受銀行關係的影響，也須與公司是否有利有關，希望未來的實證能證明當公司治理愈強，則銀行往來關係與公司風險承受度間有更顯著的關係。 A number of important policy and research issues the relationships of banks with nonfinancial firms. Theory suggests that such relationships may play key roles in resolving information problems and mitigating financial market imperfections more generally. In this project, our aim is to investigate whether the link between bank relationship and corporate risk-taking is related to the role that financial constrained and corporate governance can play. The relation between bank relationship and corporate risk-taking is an extremely important topic in finance. Understanding this relation is complicated by the fact that there are a number of channels through which financial markets can affect firm’s risk-taking. . Another aim of this paper is to investigate whether a suitable bank relationship can mitigate a firm’s financial constraints and increase their risk-taking. The term “financial constraints” means that a lack of internal funds may negatively affect a firm’s investment when the capital market is imperfect. Our hypothesis is that a strong bank relationship improves asymmetric information between firms and banks by alleviating the problem of financial constraints since banks can provide liquidity when needed. Thus, a firm with a relationship with banks may be more likely to increase their risk-taking, especially financial constrained firms. There are many arguments in the literature that could justify a positive association between investor protection and corporate risk-taking. Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. We want not only to examine the relationship between bank relationship and the risk choices in corporate investment, but also to understand if this relationship is affected by corporate governance. Our perspective is that the risk choices are affected not just by the bank relationship, but also by the benefits that firm can capture. We hope to offer justification for a positive association between bank and risk-taking when firm’s corporate governance is strong.
