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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://140.128.103.80:8080/handle/310901/24922


    Title: A multiple-key management scheme in wireless sensor networks
    Authors: Liu, J.-C.;Huang, Y.-L.;Leu, F.-Y.;You, I.;Chiang, F.-C.;Yang, C.-T.;Chu, W.C.-C.
    Contributors: Department of Computer Science, TungHai University
    Keywords: An incrementally constructed system;Key distribution;Management scheme;Newly joining node;Shared key;Communication;Cryptography;Information science;Joining;Security systems;Sensors;Wireless sensor networks;Sensor nodes
    Date: 2013-09-02
    Issue Date: 2014-06-20T02:04:52Z (UTC)
    Publisher: Regensburg
    Abstract: In a wireless sensor network (WSN), in order to provide a secure communication environment for all the sensor nodes, we often securely authenticate network nodes and protect all the messages delivered among them. When a sensor node (or simply a node or a sensor) newly joins a WSN, it is required for the Key Distribution Server (KDS) to distribute those generated security keys to this node and all the existing nodes before they can securely communicate with each other. But due to the wireless nature, when a node broadcasts a message M, all its neighbors can receive M. To securely protect this message, a security mechanism is required. Therefore, in this paper we propose a Multiple-key Management Scheme (MMaS for short), in which a sensor N receives two sets of keys from the KDS when the system starts up. The first set, named communication keys, is used by N to securely communicate with its neighbor sensors; the other, called the individual key, is employed to encrypt messages delivered between N and the KDS. When N would like to communicate with another node, e.g., M, they exchange their IDs with each other so as to correctly identify their common keys (CKs), which are used to individually generate a shared key (SK) on both sides for encrypting/decrypting messages transmitted between them. When N leaves the underlying network, the CKs currently related to N can be reused by a newly joining sensor, e.g., M. However, when M joins the network, if no such used ID is available, M will be given a new ID and CKs by the KDS. The KDS will encrypt the CKs, that will be used by an existing node H to communicate with M, with the individual key of H so that only H rather than M can correctly decrypt the CKs, with which to securely communicate with M. The security analysis shows that the proposed system is secure. ? IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2013.
    Relation: CD-ARES 2013 Workshops: 2nd International Workshop on Modern Cryptography and Security Engineering, MoCrySEn 2013 and 3rd International Workshop on Security and Cognitive Informatics for Homeland Defense, SeCIHD 2013
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics),V.8128 LNCS,P.337-344
    Appears in Collections:[資訊工程學系所] 會議論文

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