本研究以2005年至2010年於美國專利暨商標局申請專利之台灣電子業上市、上櫃之家族企業為研究對象。以專利權數與專利權被引證數為衡量指標，分別代表創新數量與創新品質，並運用結構方程模式(Structural Equation Modeling)之特性，以補足過去研究方法之不足，全面檢測股權結構、創新績效與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性。研究結果主要發現如下：(1)家族持股的多寡並不會影響創新績效；而家族持股數越多，高階經理人薪酬越低。(2)機構投資人持股增加，有助於提升公司之創新績效，進而增加高階經理人薪酬。(3)將機構投資人區分為外國機構投資人與本土機構投資人後發現，外國機構投資人持股越多，該公司創新績效越好，進而增加高階經理人薪酬。而本土機構投資人持股數與高階經理人薪酬無直接關連，創新績效對於本土機構投資人持股與高階經理人薪酬之關係存在負向之間接效果。從結果也可看出，機構投資人進行投資時較注重專利權被引證數，因此企業除了需注重創新數量外，更需注意創新品質。 This paper examines the relationships among ownership structure, Innovation performance and top executive compensation in family firm for Taiwan’s listed electronics companies that applied for patents in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) within the period 2005 to 2010. I also employ patent and citation as the measures of innovation quantity and innovation Quality. Specifically, I examine the extent to which firm innovation performance with mediate the relationship between ownership structure and compensation and apply Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and bootstrapping to replenish the inadequacies of research methods for prior research. The main findings are as follows: (1) family ownership does not affect innovation performance; the more family ownership, the lower top management compensation. (2) increased institutional ownership helps to improve innovation performance, thus increases top management compensation. (3) the higher foreign institutional ownership, the better innovation performance of the company, which leads to higher top management compensation. Domestic institutional ownership has no direct relationship with top management compensation. Innovation performance has an indirect negative effect on the relationship between local institutional shareholding and top management compensation. The empirical results also show that institutional investors emphasize more on the number of citations than the number of patents. Therefore, companies not only focus on innovation quantity, but also should pay attention to innovation quality.
