重大資本支出決策、CEO權力與公司價值

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Title:	重大資本支出決策、CEO權力與公司價值
Other Titles:	Substantial Capital Expenditure, CEO Power and Corporate Value
Authors:	張嘉恬 Chang, Chia-Tien
Contributors:	蕭慧玲 Shiau, Huey-Ling 財務金融學系
Keywords:	公司價值;CEO權力;資本支出 CEO Power;Capital Expenditure;Corporate Value
Date:	2015
Issue Date:	2015-12-22T03:24:28Z (UTC)
Abstract:	投資決策是公司未來獲利與成長性的重要指標之一，然而CEO對於公司的決策與執行有不可忽視的影響力，並且可能有正面與負面的影響。因此，本文參考Finkelstein (1992)與Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002)的研究，將CEO權力區分為資源依賴理論的聲望權力與專家知識權力，以及代理問題理論的結構權力與所有權權力。本文以上述理論探討CEO權力對重大資本支出的影響。並且，進一步區分不同生命週期階段的公司是否對資本支出決策有所差異。另外，本文也探討CEO權力對公司投資偏離程度的影響。最後當投資機會不佳時，公司進行投資活動是否會影響到公司價值也是本文的探討主題。實證結果顯示在公司投資機會愈佳時，公司愈會增加其資本支出，而成熟期公司並無此現象。而在CEO權力對資本支出影響的部分，公司傾向支持資源依賴理論，在投資不足與成長期公司特別顯著，意即當公司面臨投資機會不佳時，會仰賴CEO的判斷減少公司的資本支出，以規避未來的不確定性。然而，在投資過度與成熟期類型的公司皆不支持資源依賴理論以及代理問題理論。另外，進一步探討CEO權力與公司投資偏離程度的關係，可以發現在投資不足的公司中，當代理問題理論的CEO權力愈高時，公司投資偏離程度的情況會更加嚴重，意即CEO會降低公司投資決策效率，然而在投資過度公司並無此現象，其隱含CEO在投資不足類型公司的投資決策上較具有影響力，且會更加保守使投資不足情況更為嚴重。最後，當公司進行愈多的資本支出會使公司價值上升，且成長期公司的價值提升會高於成熟期，但是當公司面臨投資機會不佳時，公司增加資本投資反而會使公司價值下降。 Investment decision is one of the indicators of the firm's future profitability. However, CEO’s power may have both positive and negative effects on firm’s decision and execution. For the reason that this paper uses two kinds of theories to distinguish the CEO power. One of theory is “Resource Dependence Theory”, including reputation power and expert knowledge power. Another one is “Agency Problem Theory”, including structure power and ownership power. We use these two theories to investigate the effect of CEO power on substantial capital expenditure and the degree of deviation from the investment. Besides, we distinguishes firm's life cycle into growth and mature, in order to compare the firm's capital expenditure decisions. Finally, we also investigates that whether the substantial capital expenditure decision affect firm's value.Empirical results show that the firm has more investment opportunities; it would tend to increase capital expenditure to get profit. Besides, the impact of CEO power to firm’s capital expenditures, its support resource dependence theory. It means when firm faced on poor investment opportunities, it will rely on CEO’s decisions and reduce the capital expenditure to avoid future uncertainties. Furthermore, we find that when firm is underinvestment, CEO’s structure power and ownership power of the agency problem theory is higher, the degree of deviation from the investment situation is more serious. It means that underinvested firm has more influential on the investment decisions than others, and will make more conservative investment. Finally, we find capital expenditure will increase corporate value, especially growth firm. However, when the firm faced on poor investment opportunities, increasing capital expenditure will make the corporate value worsen.
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