本文針對所有可獲得資料的美國上市櫃公司，利用迴歸分析探討財務報表重編與高階經理人離職率的關係，以及財務報表重編與高階經理人獎酬特徵二者和選擇權重訂價之關聯。實證結果發現，高階經理人離職率會受財務報表重編影響。因財務報表重編之負面訊息特性，可能迫使高階經理人去職，或因對公司失去信心而自行離職。另外，實證結果亦發現，財務報表重編可能提昇公司選擇權重訂價之傾向。此現象可能起因於財務報表重編所造成的股價下跌及高階經理人離職率之提昇。於分析高階經理人獎酬特性時，本文發現，其會影響公司是否採用選擇權重訂價。亦即高階經理人的獎酬特性會影響其對選擇權重訂價的支持與否，以及會考量選擇權所產生的財富效果。最後，進一步分析高階經理人離職率不同的公司，其選擇權重訂價與財務報表重編間之關聯時，實證結果發現，高階經理人離職率較高的公司，財務報表重編會造成公司採用選擇權重訂價。此結果隱含，公司是否採用選擇權重訂價會考量高階經理人離職率之影響。 Through observing the companies located in U.S. that data is available, this paper examines the relationship between restatement and executives’ turnover, and the relationship among stock option repricing, restatement and executives’ compensation characteristics. The empirical result shows that restatement may affect executives’ turnover. This result implicates that the executives may leave for the bad future of the companies, or taking the responsibility of making restatement. Futhermore, it is found that restatement may enhance the tendency of adopting stock option repricing, because restatement may decrease the stock price and increase the executives’ turnover. When analyzing the executives’ compensation characteristics the result suggest that it may affect the tendency of adopting stock option repricing, because it changes the executives’ standpoint and the wealth which come from stock option. At last, this paper inspects the connection between stock option repricing and restatement under the two groups that executives’ turnover is different. It is found that the companies adopted stock option repricing may experience the event of restatement only when the executives’ turnover is higher. This finding implies that to adopt the stock option repricing or not, the companies may consider the executives’ turnover.
