Tunghai University Institutional Repository:Item 310901/31668
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 21921/27947 (78%)
Visitors : 4216690      Online Users : 107
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://140.128.103.80:8080/handle/310901/31668


    Title: 董監事質押與財務限制之相關性研究-以台灣上市櫃企業為例
    Other Titles: Share Pledging of Directors and Financial Constraint: Evidence from Listed Firms in Taiwan
    Authors: 何俞奇
    HO, YU-CHI
    Contributors: 陳家偉;俞一唐
    CHEN, CHIA-WEI;YU, I-TANG
    財務金融學系
    Keywords: 董監事質押;財務限制
    Share Pledging of Directors;Financial Constraint
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-12-16T04:06:39Z (UTC)
    Abstract: 本研究欲探討董監事質押比率與公司財務限制之間的相關性。為了預防金融危機期間的影響,以2010至2017年的上市櫃公司作為樣本,並使用Kaplan and Zingales (1997)所提出的KZ Index做為財務限制的衡量指標。研究內容包括各個變數的敘述統計量,並以最小平方法(OLS)進行迴歸分析來驗證假說。實證結果支持以下論點:董監事質押比率對於公司財務限制是有正向影響的,亦即高度的董監事質押比率會使公司的財務限制程度提高;但是在低質押群組中,董監事質押比率對於公司財務限制的影響力,相較於高質押群組是較高的,本文推測由於高質押群組本身可能就處於財務受限的狀態,因此董監事質押行為對於財務限制程度的影響力將會降低。
    This empirical study aims to explore the correlation between share pledging of directors and the financial constraint. We use firm-year observations of listed firms traded in either Taiwan Stock Exchange or Taipei Exchange during 2010 and 2017 as samples to avoid unusual effects caused by the Financial Crisis. To measure the financial constraint, the KZ Index proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is adopted. The empirical results show the followings. Share pledging of directors has a positive impact on the financial constraint, that is, a high pledge ratio of the directors increases the degree of the firms' financial constraint. Furthermore, the impact of the pledge ratio of the directors on the financial constraint in the low pledge group is greater than it is in the high pledge group. We argue that the low impact of the pledge behavior of the directors in the high pledge group is due to the fact that these firms have been suffered by severe financial constraint.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance ] Master's Theses

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    107THU00304009-001.pdf1880KbAdobe PDF31View/Open


    All items in THUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    本網站之東海大學機構典藏數位內容,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback