本研究探討薪酬制度的設計如何影響企業從事企業社會責任，以及在不同薪酬制度下，企業社會責任如何影響股價風險。採用天下企業CSR公民獎評選出的2007年到2016年任一年度曾獲獎的公司，定義為有從事企業社會責任的公司，並以公司規模近似及產業別相同的標準找沒有得獎的配對公司，定義為沒有從事企業社會責任或從事企業社會責任但績效差的公司；並從台灣經濟新報資料庫蒐集高階經理人薪酬資料，及股價日資料以計算股價風險。研究結果發現大部分的高階經理人薪酬和企業社會責任為正向顯著關係，企業社會責任和下檔風險為負向顯著關係，在固定薪金、獎金及特支相對較多的情形下，企業社會責任和下檔風險的負向顯著關係更加明顯；在固定薪金、員工認股權相對較多的情形下，企業社會責任和股價崩跌風險為正向顯著關係；而當經理人擁有現金股利或員工認股權時，企業社會責任對於下檔風險的降低效果有些微減少。 This study discusses how the design of the executive compensation system influences corporate social responsibility, and how corporate social responsibility affects stock risk under different compensation systems. We collected the companies that had been selected by the Exellence in Corporate Social Responsibility of Common Wealth Magazine in any year from 2007 to 2016, and we defined them as “A company which engaged in CSR”. Based on the asset scale and the industry category of listed companies, we selected the firms which were not awarded a prize in the ratio of one to one, and we defined them as “A company which didn’t engage in CSR or had bad CSR performance”. The data of executive compensation information and daily stock price for calculating stock risk were collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). The research results showed that most of the executive compensation was significantly and positively related to corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility was significantly and negatively related to downside risk. When salary and bonus and special expenses were relatively high, corporate social responsibility was more significantly and negatively related to downside risk. When salary and employee stock options were relatively high, corporate social responsibility was significantly and positively related to crash risk. When the manager had cash bonus or employee stock options, the effect of reducing downside risk was a little bit decreased.
