本文旨在探討資訊不對稱和代理問題下，未來投資收益不確定性對公司影響為何，除了透過模型建立以觀察分析融資限制與環境不確定如何影響公司的投資與現金流量敏感度，與提供透過不確定對代理問題影響之管道進而觀察投資與現金流量之改變，並發展實證模型來驗證之。結果顯示融資限制程度較高之樣本，不確定性程度和投資對現金流量敏感度之間呈現負向關係；再者，發現代理問題單獨對投資與現金流量敏感度無顯著影響，然在高不確定性與高代理問題下，不確定性對公司之投資對現金流量敏感度呈顯著負向影響。綜以上結果可知投資不確定性對公司之融資與投資決策具相當的影響力，此為融資限制形成原因探討提供了另一個探討的方向。 This paper aims to study, under the information asymmetry and agency problems, the effect of investment revenue uncertainty on the sensitivity between investment and cash flow. In addition to develop the theory model to observe the relationship between uncertainty and investment-cash flow sensitivities, and uncertainty may affect investment-cash flow sensitivities through the channel of agency problems.<br>This paper also provides empirical results to confirm the model. The first result shows that investment-cash flow sensitivities will be decreasing in the degree of uncertainty of financially constrained firms. Next, agency problems do not effect investment-cash flow sensitivities significantly. However, the firms with high uncertainty and high agency problems have negative effect to investment-cash flow sensitivities significantly. On the whole, investment uncertainty affect the investment and finance policy of a firm, and this provide another research for the formation reason of financing constraints.
