技術選擇與垂直整合之策略分析

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Title:	技術選擇與垂直整合之策略分析
Other Titles:	Strategy Analysis in Technological Choice and Vertical Integration
Authors:	白峻宇 Bai, Jiun-Yu
Contributors:	謝登隆 Shieh, Deng-Lung 東海大學企業管理學系碩士班
Keywords:	垂直整合;市場封殺;完全封殺;部份封殺;技術選擇 Vertical Integration;Market Foreclosure;Complete Foreclosure;Partial Foreclosure;Technological Choice
Date:	2002
Issue Date:	2011-05-19T05:31:49Z (UTC)
Abstract:	近年來不論何種產業皆遭受到購併（Merger&Acquisition，M&A）風潮的席捲，不論企業是基於何種原因與動機都紛紛投入購併的潮流中，企業的相互整併嚴然已成為公司追求成長的新利器。然而在眾多的企業購併案中約有30﹪∼50﹪的案例是失敗的，因此企業此種類似賭博式的公司成長策略亦吸引諸多學者先進投入相關的研究領域。垂直整合策略在企業決定本身之垂直範圍時便占了極重要的地位，產業中一家廠商的垂直整合動作很可能會改變整個產業結構，因為整合廠商很可能在垂直整合後採取完全封殺或是部份封殺策略，透過市場機能運作後各廠商的市場力量（market power）亦會產生巨大的變化，進而影響到整合與非整合廠商的利潤水準。而廠商在採取垂直整合策略時不外乎是為了降低生產成本與確保關鍵零組件的來源或銷售通路，若上游廠商在整合後進一步採取市場封殺策略亦可能會提高下游競爭對手的成本使其處於不利的競爭地位。在以往市場封殺的相關理論中皆著重於假設廠商採取垂直整合策略時只會整合一家不同產業層級的廠商，但在現實商業環境中整合廠商往往是大動作的整合多家廠商，在此情況下垂直整合策略除了可能存在Salinger（1988）所提出的「市場封殺的效果」與「節省成本的效果」之外，亦可能產生「市場力量的效果」，透過此三種效果的互相消長作用以達到提昇廠商利潤或是封殺競爭廠商的策略性目的。本研究主要探討在一連續市場（successive market）中，上游的獨占廠商（monopoly firm）面臨了一家潛在競爭廠商進入市場的威脅，而此獨占廠商生產之財貨透過中間市場販售給下游n家獨立的廠商，且產業中存在著兩種技術─標準技術（standard technology）與非標準技術（nonstandard technology），整合廠商採取不同的技術也代表了其不同的策略性目的。我們分別分析上游現存廠商之最適技術與策略選擇，並進一步討論在廠商之各種技術、整合策略與整合下游獨立廠商家數選擇下，對整合與非整合廠商利潤變化和中間財貨與最終財貨市場之價格影響，並分析上游現存廠商之最適技術與策略選擇。 In recent years, M&A make big influence in all kinds of industries. No matter what are the motives of businesses, these businesses throw themselves into the trend of M&A. Integrate between businesses has already become a new method for business growth. In numerous cases about business merger, however, there are about 30 to 50 percent of these cases were failing. Therefore, the growth strategies of business, which just like gamble, attract many scholars to research this issue. Vertical integration plays an important role when firm decides its own vertical scope. Firm’s action in VI may change industrial structure wholly, because VI firm may adopt foreclosure or strategic purchase after VI. Through market mechanism, the market power of each firm may have tremendous changes which have influence on the profits of VI or non-VI firm. To cut down costs and to ensure the source of key factors are the motives for a firm to choose VI. If upstream firm adopt foreclosure after VI, this strategy may raise the cost of oppose firms in downstream and let them stay at a disadvantage situation. In past theories about foreclosure which all emphasize the assumption about firm will just integrate one firm at different level when it adopt VI. In current situation, however, VI firm always integrate many firms on a grand scale. In this situation, VI may emerge “foreclosure effects” and “saving cost effects” just like what Salinger(1988) said, and it may also emerge “market power effects”. Through the interaction of these three effects, firm can achieve the strategic purpose of raise firm’s profits or foreclose oppose firms. In this research, a successive market is our main subject. We discuss monopoly firm in upstream faces enter threaten of a oppose firm, and monopoly firm sales its product to n downstream firms through intermediate market. There are two kinds of technologies in industry--standard technology and nonstandard technology, VI firm adopts different technology means it has different purpose. We analyze the suitable technology and strategic choices of upstream incumbent, furthermore, we discuss the influence on the profits fluctuate and price fluctuate on intermediate and final goods market of VI and non-VI firms. Different technologies, VI strategy and the number of VI firms downstream are three important factors when we analyze upstream incumbent’s suitable technology and strategic choices.
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