本研究依據金融監督管理委員會發布的《股票上市或於證券商營業處所買賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法》訂定之專業性分類，將薪酬委員區分為學術界人士、專門職業人士以及公司業務相關實務界人士。本研究旨探討具上述《設置辦法》專業性薪酬委員會，相對於不具備者，對高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估之影響。本研究更進一步探討具財務或會計專長之薪酬委員會，相對於不具備者，對高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估之影響。研究對象為台灣上市(櫃)公司，樣本期間為2011年至2013年，實證結果顯示，依據《設置辦法》分類之專業性薪酬委員會，相對於不具備者，未發現使用相對績效評估衡量高階經理人薪酬之證據；然而，具財務或會計專長之薪酬委員會，會使用相對績效評估衡量高階經理人薪酬，亦指公司在衡量高階經理人績效時，有與同業之間相互比較。根據上述結果，本研究建議《設置辦法》之專業性分類可稍作調整，並考慮將財務或會計專業人士納入其分類中。 Prior studies find little evidence that executive compensation will be filtered out the performances from peer firms. This study argues that whether firms take relative performance evaluation into consideration when designing executive compensation is dependent on different kinds of expertise that compensation committee members have. First, I classify different kinds of expertise of compensation committee members by the law announced by Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), which are members with academic background, members with professional certificates, and members with business experiences. Besides, I also hand collect the information whether the members have accounting expertise or financial expertise. Using a sample of listed firms in Taiwan from 2011 to 2013, the empirical results do not support that the expertise of compensation committees defined by the FSC improve the association between executives’ compensation and relative performance evaluation. However, the empirical results support my arguments that the accounting expertise or financial expertise improve the association between executives’ compensation and relative performance evaluation.
