Tunghai University Institutional Repository:Item 310901/31085
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    题名: 友好薪酬委員會是否無益?
    其它题名: Are Friendly Compensation Committees Harmful?
    作者: 許舜雅
    HSU,SHUN-YA
    贡献者: 潘虹華
    Pan,Hung-Hua
    會計學系
    关键词: 投票權及現金流量權之偏離程度;友好薪酬委員會;高階經理人超額薪酬;公司績效
    Separation of voting right and ownership;Friendly compensation committee;Executive excess compensation;operating performance
    日期: 2018
    上传时间: 2019-01-10T08:59:58Z (UTC)
    摘要: 本研究旨在探討控制股東投票權及現金流量權之偏離程度愈大的公司,是否會選任友好薪酬委員會,更進一步探討友好薪酬委員會帶來的監督及諮詢效果。研究對象為台灣上市(櫃)公司。實證結果指出,控制股東投票權及現金流量權之偏離程度愈大的公司,愈會選任友好薪酬委員會,然而,選任友好薪酬委員會的公司,愈會有高階經理人超額薪酬,但可以提高公司績效,表明友好薪酬委員會的諮詢效益會大於監督無效的後果。本研究使用不同的會計績效和採用工具變數,相關實證結果皆不變。本研究貢獻為提供證據表明友好薪酬委員會為最適契約配置,此外,東亞國家與台灣的股權結構皆有投票權及現金流量權之偏離程度較大的情況,故本研究結果對股權結構之文獻具有貢獻。
    The purpose of this study is to investigate whether firms with greater separation of voting right and ownership will elect friendly compensation committees. Specifically, this study examines the monitoring and consulting effects brought by the friendly compensation committees. Using a sample of listed firms in Taiwan, the empirical results show that firms with greater separation of voting right and ownership tend to appoint friendly compensation committees. Besides, the results show the firms with the friendly compensation committees have higher executive excess compensation and better operating performances, implying that the consulting benefits outweigh the monitoring losses brought from the friendly compensation committees. The results are consistent after controlling for endogenous problems and using other proxies to measure operating performances. Overall, the contribution of this study is to provide evidence that the appointment of friendly compensation committees is equilibrium in optimal contract. The stockholder equity structure is similar within East Asian countries, and thereby highlighting the contribution of this study.
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