本文在內生成長模型架構下探討租稅查緝政策對經濟成長與貧富不均的影響。我們假設經濟體系中存在兩種人：會逃稅的資本家與不會逃稅的勞動者。政府分別對於資本家與勞動者課徵不同的稅率，將總稅收分配在租稅查緝政策的審計成本以及公共基礎建設。本文將探討政府政策，如所得稅率、逃稅罰款倍率、監督逃稅所需付的費用多寡，對於經濟成長、貧富不均度與社會福利的影響。主要有以下發現：第一、增加罰款倍率對於經濟成長以及縮短貧富差距有最好的效果。第二、政府提高勞動稅率有可能促進經濟成長，卻會造成貧富差距擴大。第三、逃稅政策皆具有降低貧富差距的效果。 This paper examines the effects of tax enforcement policies on growth, income inequality and welfare in an endogenous growth framework. There are two types of individuals in our economy: the capitalists who are able to engage in tax evasion activities and the labor who are with full tax compliance. The government levies different tax rates on both types, and then allocates the tax revenues between enforcing tax compliance and providing public infrastructure. We examine the effects of policies, including the tax rates, and punishment–fines, on growth, income inequality and welfare. The main findings are as follows. First, increasing punishment–fines can stimulate growth and reduce income inequality. Second, increasing the labor tax may boost economic growth, while it also worsens inequality. Finally, most tax enforcement policies have a positive effect on income inequality.
